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WHY THE LAW OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
BARELY MATTERS
JEFFREY

M.

LIPSHAW*

Why do we not see a rich literature in the law of entrepreneur
ship? There is extensive economic and finance literature on entre
preneurship, but hardly writing of the same quantity as to the legal
aspects.l I taught a seminar in technology startups and venture cap

* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School; AB, University of Michi
gan; JD, Stanford University. This Article is based on a presentation given by Professor
Lipshaw at the Third Annual Conference on Entrepreneurship and Community Eco
nomic Development on October 17, 2008. This conference is hosted by Western New
England College Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneurship. The
theme for the 2008 conference was "Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy."
1. I originally made this observation in 2006 based on a search of the SSRN ab
stract database. On September 9, 2008, I updated the search. Using the search terms
"entrepreneur, entrepreneurship" in the SSRN abstract database (title, content, or
keywords), I pulled up one thousand papers. By reviewing those titles, as well as by
searching combinations of the words "legal" and "law," on the one hand, and "entre
preneur" and "entrepreneurship," on the other, I was able to come up with the follow
ing set of twenty-seven articles (not including a previous draft of this one) that, in my
subjective view, address the intersection of law and entrepreneurship. As the following
list indicates, there has been additional work in the two intervening years. However,
while I am sure that this is neither a complete list nor a precise measurement, I stand by
the observation as a fair description in order of magnitude as between financiaVeco
nomic and legal scholarship about entrepreneurship.
In addition to other pieces noted throughout this essay, the articles are: Kenneth
Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 161 (2007); Jochen Bigus, Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism,
and Patent Law, 33 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCOUNTING 939 (2006); Peter David Blanck et aI.,
The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Preliminary Study of Entre
preneurship in Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1583 (2000); Linda Christine Fentiman, A Dis
tance Education Primer: Lessons from My Life as a Dot.Edu Entrepreneur, 6 N.C. J.L.
& TECH. 41 (2004); Catherine L. Fisk, The Story of Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta: Em
ployee Inventors in Corporate Research & Development-Reconciling Innovation with
Entrepreneurship, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 143 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian
Lester eds., 2006); Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems
in Economic Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 155 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 2005); Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capi
tal Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV.
874 (2003); Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepre
neurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 577 (2008); Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepre
neurs on Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71
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ital in the spring of 2005, and still the best we could do for a broad
based legal text was a practice manuaJ.2 There are certainly aspects
(2008); Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in
the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401 (2004); Seung-Hyun Lee, Yasuhiro
Yamakawa, & Mike W. Peng, An Empirical Examination of 'Barrier to Exit': How Does
an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law Affect Entrepreneurship Development at a
Societal Level?, in FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 2007: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH CONFERENCE
(Andrew Zacharakis et al. eds., 2007); Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and
What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMPo LAB. L. & POL'y J. 817 (2007); Amir N. Licht
& Jordan I. Siegel, The Social Dimensions of Entrepreneurship, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 511 (Mark Casson et al. eds., 2006); Robert J. Miller, American
Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique Challenges, Unlimited Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297
(2008); Sean M. O'Connor, Teaching IP from an Entrepreneurial Counseling and Trans
actional Perspective, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 877 (2008); Simon C. Parker, Law and the
Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COMPo LAB. L. & POL'y J. 695 (2007); D. Gordon
Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, 2 EN
TREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 353 (2006); John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy
Law and Entrepreneurship (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 105/2008,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=762144; Matthieu Chemin, The Impact of the
Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's Access to Justice Programme
(Centre Interuniversitaire sur Ie Risque, les Politiques Economiques et I'Emploi [Inter
Univ. Ctr. on Risk, Econ. Policies & Employment], Working Paper No. 07-27, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=1018901; Catherine Fisk, "An Ingenious Man Ena
bled by Contract": Entrepreneurship and the Rise of Contract (Duke Sci., Tech., & Inno
vation Working Paper No. 16, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=983739;
Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Entrepreneurial Law (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Pa
per No. RWP07-023, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=984311(2007); Brian J.
Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in VC-Backed Firms (Oct. 13, 2008)
(unpublished paper on file with the University of California, Berkeley School of Law),
available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=1162372 (2008); Anthony J. Luppino, Can Do:
Training Lawyers to Be Effective Counselors to Entrepreneurs-Report to the Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation (Jan. 30, 2008) (unpublished report on file with the Uni
versity of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law), available at http://ssrn.com!
abstract=1157065; Michael J. Whincop, Entrepreneurial Governance (Aug. 2000) (un
published paper on file with the Griffith Law School), available at http://ssrn.com!
abstract=254169. The SSRN search did not turn up other pieces of which I am aware,
such as Anthony J. Luppino, Minding More than Our Own Business: Educating En
trepreneurial Lawyers Through Law School-Business School Collaborations, 30 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 151 (2007); D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good
Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETfE L. REv. 825
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Independent Legal Significance]; Mark C. Suchman & Mia L.
Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes
in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 679 (1996).
2. On the advice of Joseph Grundfest, who offered a similar course at Stanford, I
assigned CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR'S GUIDE
TO BUSINESS LAW, (2007), and ALEX WILMERDING, TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS
(2004), in addition to a course package with assorted readings on various subjects. I
considered using JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY,
AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS (Martin D. Ginsburg & Donald E. Rocap eds.,
2007), but it is heavily oriented to tax planning (although it is the benchmark on that
subject). Another candidate was JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE
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of the entrepreneurship process that have imported significant as
pects of contract, tax planning, corporate, and intellectual property
law. Yet, the only unique jurisprudence of entrepreneurial law I
have yet been able to identify is the law applying anti-dilution
clauses in what is known as the "down round"-where the startup
company has a lower value in later rounds of financing, and either
the founders or the investors have to bear the brunt of the 10ss.3
Two of the most accomplished "law and entrepreneurship" scholars
have attempted to do away with the elephant in the room-namely,
that the same criticism Frank Easterbrook levied about the law of
cyberspace nearly fifteen years ago might well be transferred to the
law of entrepreneurship today: "there was no more a 'law of cyber
space' than there was a 'Law of the Horse.'''4 Instead, "law and
entrepreneurship" thrives not in doctrine, or even in current inter
disciplinary law and social science, but on the ground in clinical
programs. 5
Neither the profession nor the academy has yet figured out
how the legal profession should best assist this unusual creature, the
entrepreneur. 6 Entrepreneurs face all sorts of contingencies: cash
flow problems, partner breakups, natural disasters, loss of a major
customer, new competition, industry change, loss of key personnel,
CAPITAL (1999), which I described in the syllabus as "a handy little volume that de
scribes issues. It does not contain forms or voluminous details on structuring." In prac
tice, I had admired START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES: PLANNING, FINANCING AND
OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS (Gregory C. Smith ed., 1997), but it was simply
too expensive and, in some areas, too outdated to assign to students.
3. See Smith, Independent Legal Significance, supra note 1.
4. Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501, 501-02 (1999) (recounting a speech by Judge Easter
brook); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-09; see also Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 71-72.
5. See Luppino, Can Do: Training Lawyers to Be Effective Counselors to Entre
preneurs, supra note 1, at 17-19. There are dozens of small business and startup clinics
in law schools across the country, one of which is run at the host school for this sympo
sium, Western New England College School of Law. See Western New England Col
lege School of Law, Small Business Clinic, http://wwwl.law.wnec.edulcurrent/index.
cfm?selection=doc.5689 (last visited May 15, 2009). Thomas H. Morsch, Director and
Clinical Professor of Law in the Small Business Opportunity Center at the Northwest
ern University School of Law, advised me on September 11, 2008, that the business
clinic listserv he administers has 149 participants.
6. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Sur
vival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REv. 45. Professor
Utset characterized the typical founding entrepreneur as "over-optimistic," "overconfi
dent" (indeed to the point of "blind[ness] ... to the need for more information"), better
at innovating than running a company, having "poor management skills," lacking "busi
ness savvy," and having "bounded rationality" (unable to plan well for contingencies).
Id. at 92-93, 100-04, 114 n.228.
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theft and embezzlement, and family problems.? Who is better
equipped than a well-trained lawyer to assist a client in planning
ahead? But how many of these contingencies are addressable in
advance by the tools we teach lawyers? The primary means by
which business lawyers attempt to impose order on the contingency
of the heteronomous world is the institution of contract which, not
withstanding rational actor and behavioral economic theory to the
contrary, is limited at best. 8 Only a few of the remedies to this set
of problems suggested by one popular pundit were expressly legal:
draw up a partnership agreement with a buy-sell mechanism; have
adequate insurance policies against natural disaster, fraud, and
theft; and develop an estate plan for the owner-operator. 9
Despite valiant (if nascent) efforts to show that law, or at least
courts and doctrine, matter in the broader study of entrepreneur
ship,lO I am skeptical that it really does, for reasons that underlie
my broader view about the relationship of law to business and ev
eryday life. To put it bluntly, my observation after a long career in
the business world, which included the representation of startup en
trepreneurs as well as would-be entrepreneurs in the corporate set
ting, is that "law" makes a lot more difference to lawyers than to
anybody else. l l I do not think it is simply because law is what we
7. Rhonda Abrams, 9 Problems to Avoid by Planning Ahead, USA TODAY, Nov.
20, 2006, at 5E.
8. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex
Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2005) [hereinafter Lipshaw,
Contingency and Contracts].
9. Abrams, supra note 7. This is not to suggest that there are no legal issues that
are core to the venture capital business. But like the "law of the horse," it is an amal
gam of tax, choice of entity, and other business-planning issues. The one area that is
unique is the so-called down round issue.
10. See supra note 1.
11. Abrams, supra note 7. See generally Smith & Ueda, supra note 1, at 366-68.
When sophisticated business people think about agreements and send their lawyers off
to scriven, are the lawyers writing the agreements for courts or for each other?
Whether or not contracts are interpreted textually or contextually, it is probably fair to
say that the lawyers, if you asked them, were doing their best to make the entire agree
ment textual, and not contextual. And the reason for textuality is that the writing will
be read and interpreted by others. Or will it? Have you ever set aside a draft and re
read it a year later? Or re-read an old article that you wrote five or six years ago? Who
wrote it? So I think there is something far more nuanced going on than the rational
model that we write contracts because we are addressing the hypothetical judge who
will resolve our disputes, and in doing so, apply ex ante the rules that have been laid
down legally or linguistically, as a way now of controlling the future. Hence, I have
asked whether there is any real linkage between what the court ends up saying in a
close case of interpretation and what the parties may have intended. Jeffrey M. Lip
shaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 99 (2005) [hereinafter Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence].
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do. The fundamental reason has something to do instead with dif
ferent ways the legal mind and the entrepreneurial mind make
sense of the world, and then decide what to do about it. I contend
that "[p]racticing lawyers are reductivists in comparison to their cli
ents-reducing the complex world through the [doctrinal] science
of law to a model; [and law] professors are reductivists in compari
son to their students," aspiring to reduce the law to social science,12
Models are reductions of complexity whose power lies in explana
tion and prediction.1 3 Lawyers apply linguistic models and doctri
nal rules that impose a kind of order on the chaos of life; social
scientists discover and verify theories showing the order in human
existence (what is science if not the discovery of nature's regulari
. I.e.,
.
. Iaws.?) .
ties,
Its
In contrast, entrepreneurship is about judgment-either the
leap from the inductive inferences from what we observe to what
we generalize, or the leap from what we generalize to what we do
next. This judgment is not teachable and, instead, is learnable only
through practice. Judgment-how we infer regularities in the data
of the world or decide how to subsume the next encounter with
data under an existing rule-is still the great mystery of cognitive
science and moral philosophy. In philosophy and jurisprudence this
falls under the topic of "rule-following," and I contend here that
there are inherent philosophical (and perhaps psychological)
problems with the interaction of the lawyer and the entrepreneur.
In this essay, I will explore three rationales to explain why law
yers and entrepreneurs are like ships passing in the night: first,
there is no rule about how to apply rules; second, lawyers struggle
with the kind of judgment that comes naturally to the entrepreneur;
and third, the nature of a legal solution is essentially cognitive and
does not address the non-cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship.
First, as philosophers have shown, there is no rule for the appli
cation of a rule, and what we perceive as a given result is a matter
of social congruence rather than a result inherent in the rule itself.14
12. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law's Illusion: Scientific Jurisprudence and the Struggle
with Judgment (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1163256 [hereinafter Lipshaw, Law's Illusion].
13. See generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Models and Games: The Difference Between
Explanation and Understanding for Lawyers and Ethicists, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 613
(2008) [hereinafter Lipshaw, Models and Games].
14. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 268 (Paul Guyer & Allen W.
Wood trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO·
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §201, at 6ge (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001); Linda
Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 727,
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The social and psychological orientation of those who create law,
and those who create innovation, are at odds. As an illustration, a
lawyer's lawyer sees the world in relatively simple models by which
contracts are supposed to inhibit opportunism-e.g., the futures
contract for the purchase and sale of wheat that gives the buyer a
remedy against the seller's opportunism when the contract price
was $100 and the market price on the date of sale is $120. Indeed,
the law is an element of the heteronomous world; it controls, re
stricts, and limits the choices of the free agent.
The entrepreneur, on the other hand, sees the world as a move
able feast of phenomena, posing danger but presenting opportuni
ties to be seized and exploited, with choices to be made over and
over again. One entrepreneurship scholar sees the entrepreneur's
mode of reasoning as effectual rather than causal: while causal rea
soning posits a goal and seeks means to achieve the goal, "effectual
reasoning ... begins with a given set of means and allows goals to
emerge contingently over time from the varied imagination and di
verse aspirations of the founders and the people they interact
with."15 Philosophers teach that "[t]here is no rule for the applica
tion of a rule," and it might be the entrepreneurs' creed, because
what the philosophers are really telling us is that what we think are
rules for the application of a rule are not inherent in the rule, but in
our social constructs around it. Most of us have a common and
unremarkable understanding that the rule of 2-4-6-8 means that the
answer is 10; the entrepreneur may see it as 12 or 19 or 1-5-6.16 The
law calls for consistency and coherence in the application of rulesP
I suggest that entrepreneurs are far more at home with inconsis
tency and indeterminacy.
734-45 (1999); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76
VA. L. REV. 937, 948-49 (1990).
15. Saras D. Sarasvathy, What Makes Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurial? (Univ. of
Va., Working Paper No. UVA-ENT-0065, 2008), available at http://ssrn.comJabstract=
909038; see also Saras D. Sarasvathy, Causation and Effectuation: Toward a Theoretical
Shift from Economic Inevitability to Entrepreneurial Contingency, 26 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 243 (2001); D.K. Sarasvathy, H.A. Simon & L.B. Lave, Perceiving and Managing
Business Risks: Differences Between Entrepreneurs and Bankers, 33 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR
& ORG. 207 (1998).
16. WrITGENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 74"-75".
17. See generally RONALD DWORKrN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Belknap Press 1986) (1977)
(discussing fit and justification as the basis for integrity in law); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION
MAKrNG rN LAW AND LIFE (Tony Honore & Joseph Raz eds., Clarendon Press 2002)
(1991); William A. Edmundson, The Antinomy of Coherence and Determinacy, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1996).
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At the risk of losing my readers (if they are not already lost) in
abstraction, my intuition is that this is traceable to the different
ways entrepreneurs and lawyers might explain why things happen,
which invokes the question of causation. Hart and Honore pro
duced the most thorough discussion to date of the legal concept of
causation. IS They sought to distinguish the "historian's and the law
yer's and the plain man's use of causal notions" from those of the
scientist. 19 The goal of the former is to distinguish the singular
cause of a particular event from the set of all conditions that were
necessary for the event to occur. The goal of the latter, and the
great breakthrough of David Hume and the empiricists, was to do
away with singular causes (at least in the sense of divine or mystical
ones) in favor of causation that "lies wholly in the fact that the par
ticular events with which they are concerned exemplify some gener
alization asserting that kinds or classes of events are invariably
connected."20 We can call this latter scientific causal statement
"nomological-deductive" and the former common sense causal
statement "attributive."21
I think the "law and entrepreneurship" issue invokes causation
in two ways. First, different external observers might make either
nomological-deductive or attributive causal statements about trans
actions to which they are not parties. The irony in the Hart and
Honore treatment of Hume, I think, is that a law, as a closed sys
tem, aspires to scientific notions of causation within the system, and
regularly ignores or discounts nonlegal attributive causes. A good
example is in Ibrahim and Smith's defense of law's relevance to en
trepreneurship.22 In responding to AnnaLee Saxenian's nomologi
cal-deductive causal explanation for Silicon Valley's advantage over
Boston's Route 128 as cultural norms,23 Ibrahim and Smith seem to
give more credit to Ronald Gilson's competing nomological-deduc
18. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). I have just
pre-ordered a copy of MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (2008),
which Oxford University Press describes as "the first comprehensive attempt since Hart
and Honore to clarify the philosophical background to the legal and moral debates"
about causation. Oxford University Press, Causation and Responsibility: Michael S.
Moore, http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Law/JurisprudenceandLegal
Philosophy!?view=usa&ci=9780199256860 (last visited May 15, 2009).
19. HART & HONORE, supra note 18, at 10.
20. Id. at 9.
21. THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECITVITY IS NOT NEUTRALITY: EXPLANATORY
SCHEMES IN HISTORY 16 (1998).
22. See generally Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1.
23. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
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tive explanation: California law governing non-compete agree
ments.24 Both are scientific statements: if we could reproduce the
particular events, like cultural norms or certain laws, we could gen
eralize that entrepreneurs would flourish as a consequence. I do
not know who is right; I am suspicious, however, that lawyers' hy
potheses about the importance of law are more likely to be wishful
thinking than borne out empirically.
Further, these nomological-deductive statements still do not
get at the mystery of judgment. My Suffolk colleague, Eric
Blumenson, puts the distinction nicely in his article about the limits
of skepticism. 25 Trying to inform decision-making practice from an
outside perspective is
a category mistake that conflates two alternative views of human
action-the views from "inside" (doing it) and "outside" (observ
ing it).... From the external standpoint, one sees predictable
patterns of behavior, not autonomous subjects capable of tran
scending history through reason. But this view has no "cash
value" for the agent making the decision. 26

The philosopher Christine Korsgaard similarly criticized a dis
passionate and reductive scientism-"a description of the world
which serves the purposes of explanation and prediction"-as inca
pable of guiding the agent "when we must make our decisions and
choices 'under the idea of freedom.' "27 In short, all the science in
the world may inform our judgment or explain the circumstances of
judgment, but it is not the same as making the judgment.
My position is not that law does not matter; it is that, in the
sense of what lawyers do to reduce transactional complexity to lin
guistic precision as a matter of "rule-following" and prediction, it
barely matters. What matters is not a particular doctrine that might
be created in the law of entrepreneurship. My intuition is, instead,
that the rule of law as a social phenomenon, which has "cash-value"
to the decision-maker (in Eric Blumenson's terms), is what is fun
damentally important about law and entrepreneurship. Entrepre
neurship flourishes in a society that builds the rule of law from
Lockean assumptions about the primacy of property and the free
24. Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 82.
25. Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74
TEX. L. REV. 523 (1996).
26. Id. at 559-60 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
27. CHRlSllNE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMAllVITY 94-97 (1996).
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dom to own it and trade it. 28 There is a strong libertarian theme
here-entrepreneurial communities are the Wild West,29 wherein
the notions of personal autonomy and freedom run deep, not just
politically, but epistemologically and morally as welPo For all that
lawyers support the entrepreneurial process, like accountants, in
surance agents, business plan writers, consultants, and other trans
action cost consumers, they are merely passengers on the train to
somewhere the law cannot chart. And to the extent that theorists
have attempted to ascribe value to the lawyering process or to ad
vance a theory of the law of entrepreneurship, in most cases entre
28. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOC
RACY (1943); Howard E. Aldrich & c. Marlene Fiol, Fools Rush In? The Institutional
Context of Industry Creation, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 645 (1994). For more modern
empirical work on this, see Chemin, supra note 1; Roman Frydman, Marek P. Hessell &
Andrzej Rapaczynski, Why Ownership Matters: Entrepreneurship and the Restructuring
of Enterprises in Central Europe (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 172, 1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=194574; Simon
Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Property Rights, Finance and Entre
preneurship (CESifo Group Munich, Working Paper No. 212, 1999), available at http:"
ssm.com/abstract= 198409. I am very interested in, yet remain to be convinced of, the
Smith-Ueda working thesis that courts, as common law developers of a more flexible,
adaptable law-as compared with the civil law-have a material effect on the facilita
tion or hindrance of entrepreneurial activity. See Smith & Ueda, supra note 1, at 354. I
would suggest that the way common law judges process data and apply rules in adjudi
cation bears little resemblance to the way a Schumpeterian entrepreneur would process
data and apply rules, including the rules, where she is aware of them, laid down by the
common law judges. And if the response is, "Yes, but they have lawyers to make them
aware of the rules," I ask, "Really? How do you know? And if they do have lawyers,
do they listen to them?" Without giving it nearly the due consideration it deserves, let's
just play with the title of Frederick Schauer's Playing by the Rules. See SCHAUER,
supra note 17. What does "playing by the rules" mean to a court? What does "playing
by the rules" mean to an entrepreneur? And what does "playing by the rules" mean to
the entrepreneur's lawyer? See generally MARCUS BUCKINGHAM & CURT COFFMAN,
First, Break All the Rules (2005) (1999); BARRY J. NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, Why Not?
How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to Solve Problems Big and Small (2003).
29. Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups? 51 STAN. L. REV. 289,
290 (1999) ("[A]s a matter of culture, high-tech entrepreneurs are the cowboys of our
age. In the United States, as Willie Nelson has told us, our heroes have always been
cowboys." (citing WILLIE NELSON, My Heroes Have Always Been Cowboys, on THE
ELECTRIC HORSEMAN ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK (Columbia Records 1979))).
30. See id. at 306. To follow the Smith-Ueda thesis, is there a relationship be
tween that underlying libertarianism and the presence of a common, rather than civil,
law? See Smith & Ueda, supra note 1, at 353-54. I am not enough of a political theorist
to know. Judges could put a crimp on the economic incentives to creative destruction,
but so could legislatures and executives. But to me, that's like holding the tiller of a
small boat on the crest of a tsunami and thinking that because you can impede or en
hance the progress of the boat, you control the tsunami. Do tiller-people matter? Yes,
but not nearly as much as the tiller-people think. In this analogy, the entrepreneurs are
the seismic causes of the tsunami.
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preneurship is about something other than jurisprudence.3! Put
another way, lawyers do not precede the rule of law; rather, a social
consensus that we will abide by the rule of law permits lawyers to
flourish.
The second theme is that lawyers (or the law) struggle with the
kind of judgment that comes naturally to the entrepreneur. 32 The
creation of law is ex post; the presumption-whether in Langdellian
legal science, Holmesian legal realism,33 the currently dominant ap
proach of rational actor, or behavioral economics-must be that ac
tors may determine, to a greater or lesser extent, legal outcomes by
a rational ex ante prediction of those judgments, and to control the
outcomes with a reductive rule-based model, be it contract or other
regulation. 34 None of these models accounts for the inherent para
dox (or antinomy) of judgment. As elucidated by Kant, the issue
with judgment is that we understand that the conclusion is ours
alone (and people can differ), but at the same time we ascribe
universality to the conclusion. This is one of the themes of the Cri
31. The thrust of this work is essentially Coaseian. The best thing lawyers can do
is to reduce transaction costs-in essence, get the law out of the way of the en
trepreneurial engine. See generally Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Trans
action Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 242-45 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 242-43
(1984). Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley lawyers act as a kind of social
grease in the system of getting deals done, but that there is still nothing particularly
legal about their work. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 1, at 680-83. Professor Steven L.
Schwarcz has taken issue with the proposition that this is the primary value, but his
work still does not show that there is anything of jurisprudential import that adds value
to the entrepreneurial or transactional process. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the
Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 486, 487-88 (2007). Profes
sor Steven Hobbs attempted to put the legal aspects of entrepreneurship toward a gen
eral theory, but the result is really just a small-business lawyer's tool kit, combined with
finance and public policy impacts on the field. See generally Steven H. Hobbs, Toward
a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 241 (1997).
32. See Lipshaw, Bewitchment of Intelligence, supra note 11, at 5-6. See generally
Lipshaw, Law's Illusion, supra note 12.
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts, The Path of the Law, Address at the Boston University School of Law dedica
tion (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465-66 (1897).
34. A lawyer acting as lawyer looks from the outside in, seeking to explain and
predict. See id. But the entrepreneur is the agent who must operate under the idea of
freedom. Both Blumenson and Korsgaard follow Kant in seeing the desire of pure
reason to explain the world as if from no perspective, and in antinomical relation to the
agent, who must necessarily have a perspective. Compare KORSGAARD, supra note 27,
and Blumenson, supra note 25, with KANT, supra note 14. Kant's view is that pure
reason is incapable of establishing empirical truth (the "is"), but can be employed prac
tically to determine the "ought." See IMMANUEL KANT, CRmQUE OF PRAcnCAL REA
SON (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788).
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tique of Judgment.35 When we look at a painting, we simulta
neously (a) know it is just a matter of taste, but (b) ascribe some
objective standard of bad, good, better, worse, and best to the art. 36
If there were an algorithm for judgment, we would not prize it in
individuals the way we do, and we would be letting our computers,
rather than our lawyers, negotiate our deals. The entrepreneur's
lawyer has to balance these two dynamics: (1) the lawyerly sense
that such-and-such a provision really should go into the agreement
"to cover you just in case this-and-that happens," and (2) the busi
ness sense that the same provision could stop the deal in its tracks.
That is the antimony of deal lawyering, because from the center of
any such problem, you can always argue your way to either anti
thetical conclusion. 37
The third theme is that the very nature of a legal or regulatory
solution, by and large, is cognitive, and fails to address the
noncognitive aspects of entrepreneurship. I contend it is the law
yer's place to assume the primacy of the lawyer's particular world
view: if I process sensory data in a cognitive way, so must every
body else. What do I mean by a cognitive solution? Take the issue
of disclosure as a cure; that is, "sunlight is the best disinfectant."38
There was recently a proposal that public company proxy state
ments should include a detailed description of the heuristics by
which the board determines CEO pay, and that this would some
how cause the perceived excessive CEO pay problem to be cured. 39
I am skeptical. If the cognitive approach really worked, then we
ought to be able to reduce housing prices in California by making
every house buyer read a prospectus on the likelihood that the
house is overpriced in relation to equivalent homes in Milwaukee
or Des Moines, and in danger of destruction by tsunami, earth
quake, or high force Santa Ana winds.
35. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (J.H. Bernard
trans., Macmillan 2d ed. 1931) (1790).
36. Id. at 50-54.
37. When I am asked "how do you know which way to go?" my response is the
same as that of the Geoffrey Rush character in the movie Shakespeare in Love, who
explained why everything in the hectic production of a play always works out despite
that "the natural condition [of the theater business] is one of insurmountable obstacles
on the road to imminent disaster": "I don't know; it's a mystery." SHAKESPEARE IN
LoVE (Universal Pictures 1998).
38. LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1913).
39. Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paychecks: Group Think; Peer Pressure: Inflat
ing Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3 (Business), at 1.
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So what we find is that lawyers (or people who "think like law
yers") tend either to pose noncognitive issues as cognitive, or pro
pose cognitive solutions to noncognitive problems. 40 The question
here is not whether the entrepreneur or the lawyer is right or wrong
in his or her application of the rules to circumstances, but whether
they are even speaking the same language. 41 I suggest that we can
40. In Manuel Utset's article, he proposed that venture capitalists be required to
provide something like an S-l prospectus to the entrepreneur, designed to remedy the
perceived inequalities between entrepreneurs and the supposedly more sophisticated
venture capitalist. Utset, supra note 6, at 161-63. I have observed that there is some
thing of an infinite regress inherent in a solution that is merely more information
particularly one that smacks of the typical disclaimers that go, for example, into an SEC
registration statement for an initial public offering. I commented on this: "In sum, the
starry-eyed, cocky, sheltered engineer or scientist lacking people skills and a crystal ball
is probably already overwhelmed with information. The regress is in trying to find that
conclusive piece of information or disclosure that gets through to this kind of personal
ity." Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts, supra note 8, at 1093 n.69.
In Germany, even today, if you sell a piece of real estate, or if you sell a multibil
lion dollar company that involves the transfer of real estate, the civil code requires that
the transaction be undertaken in a notarial deed. This is hardly the notarial act of a
U.S. common law jurisdiction. The notary undertakes (for a significant fee) to serve the
function that legality, enforceability representations, and lawyers' opinions serve here.
The notary is putting the imprimatur of legality on the agreement. And if you have
ever been party to one of these events, you know that the notary (or someone delegated
by the notary) is required to read the entire document out loud (even if it's a 400-page
document including exhibits that are essentially Wall Street firm-generated doorstops).
This is an anachronism dating back to the Middle Ages, when the law prevented big city
sharpies from cheating the peasants (who generally couldn't read) out of their land.
This, I assume, was the legal equivalent of taking the about-to-be-victim, shaking him
(probably not her back then) physically about the head and shoulders, and saying "do
you understand what a stupid thing you are about to do?"
41. Compare the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches in a scene from Robert
Penn Warren's All the King's Men. Willie Stark, the Huey Long equivalent, begins his
political career as an honest idealist, duped into running in the Democratic primary as a
way of splitting the vote. Willie has been giving a boring stump speech, and this is the
exchange he has with the cynical reporter covering his campaign on the subject of the
cognitive approach:
"You tell 'em too much. Just tell 'em you're gonna soak the fat boys, and
forget the rest of the tax stuff."
"What we need is a balanced tax program. Right now the ratio between
income tax and total income for the state gives an index that-"
"Yeah," I said, "I heard the speech. But they don't give a damn about
that. Hell, make 'em cry, or make 'em laugh, make 'em think you're their
weak and erring pal, or make 'em think you're God-Almighty. Or make 'em
mad. Even mad at you. Just stir 'em up, it doesn't matter how or why, and
they'll love you and come back for more. Pinch 'em in the soft place. They
aren't alive, most of 'em, and haven't been alive in twenty years.... [Ilt's up to
you to give 'em something to stir 'em up and make 'em feel alive again. Just
for half an hour. That's what they come for. Tell 'em anything. But for Sweet
Jesus' sake don't try to improve their minds."
ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING's MEN 77 (1946).
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see the problem most clearly in the one place the law deals with the
inherent antinomy of setting rules by which it determines whether
the next case accords with preexisting rules: the patent system. 42
What constitutes creativity in lawyering is the occasional flash of
inspiration that is more akin to the inventor's work and language
than to that of the lawyer.43
To summarize, there is a jurisprudential point to be made here
about the limits of the law, or law's place in relation to other social
institutions. There is, additionally, an implication for the training of
lawyers, and the relationship of the academy to the practice. If
there is as little doctrinally as I claim that is important about the
law of entrepreneurship, what, if anything, of value (beyond the
usual transaction cost reduction)44 does an entrepreneurial lawyer
qua lawyer bring to the table? Here I want to suggest a fundamen
tal distinction between the definition of one's presently ascertain
able rights in property, and private ordering to deal with future
contingency. To quote one professor quoting an unidentified Stan
ford professor, what distinguishes the law of property is the "thing
ness of it."45 In the former, the law comes as close as it ever does to
being constitutive; in the latter, what we say now is merely ammuni
42. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
("Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary
does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the
sake of words, but words for things."); Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful
Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515 (1997). See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Can the
Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1167 (1999).
43. I am thinking here of a real invention, like Martin Lipton's creation of the
shareholder rights plan, otherwise known as the "poison pill." See e.g., Martin Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW 101 (1979); Martin Lipton & Jay
W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW 59
(1992). This was a real product, with real perceived value, and it bore the very aspects
of surprise to those of average skill in the art of corporate lawyering that a patentable
invention otherwise bears to the prior art.
44. Gilson, supra note 31; Schwarcz, supra note 3l.
45. June Carbone, Back to the Future: Intellectual Property and the Rediscovery of
Property Rights-and Wrongs, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 630 (2002). This particular
conception of property having thingness and substance strikes an epistemological or,
perhaps, an economic chord. Property is sharp and distinct compared to the inchoate
statement of future rights and liabilities in a contract. Or perhaps the thingness of prop
erty is an aspect of the availability of the heuristic or prospect theory in behavioral
economics. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); see
also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998).
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tion for instrumental use later. 46 The import of this distinction is
that the only thing truly interesting about the law of entrepreneur~
ship is more akin to the relationship of the law to property and
liberty. The entrepreneur is significantly interested in those por~
tions of the term sheet that define property rights in the event of
success. As to the rest of the lawyers' work-dealing with the reso~
lution of claims if the venture fails-it may bear the same stigma of
the law of commercial contract boilerplate: it is of significant inter~
est to the lawyers, but has no real present interest to the business
negotiators. 47
46. I recently purchased a home in Massachusetts. The residential real estate
practices were unfamiliar to me, as was the specific property, which happens to be a
condominium, although our particular unit is simply one of two buildings, the other of
which is a duplex. I realized when I was scanning the condominium master deed and
the condominium trust deed (effectively the organizing document of the condominium
association), the only thing I really cared about were those provisions that define my
present rights. So while I ignored most of the boilerplate, I read carefully the descrip
tion of my unit, my rights to common areas, my rights to exclude others from certain
areas, and my ability to control the decisions of the condominium trustees, at least as
they affected me.
In light of this recent experience, I am pondering Professor Madison's proposal to
wholly eliminate the deed as a means of conveyance, and to embody all of the rights,
expectations, and liabilities in real estate ownership and transfer in the contract itself.
See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.V. L. REV. 405, 406
(2002). To twist this to my point, I think Professor Madison is suggesting that the entire
game involves those aspects of the transaction documents that deal with future contin
gency, and that there is barely a dispute around the mundane aspects otherwise encap
sulated in the deed, like the description of the property presently owned. See id. at 407
08.
47. I do not want to minimize the subject of contract boilerplate as between ad
vantaged and disadvantaged parties. But I subscribe to the empirical view, at least on
the subject of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, "that there seem to be two
only slightly overlapping worlds out there: the world of business practice and the world
of law. In the world of business practice, law is much less significant than reputation
and leverage as forces that govern the day-to-day behavior of the actors." DANIEL
KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS ApPROACH 3 (3d ed. 2006). This is, of course, a restate
ment of Professor Macaulay's "non-contract" view. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empiri
cal View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465.
In fact, there were two presentations in a recent symposium on boilerplate provi
sions in contracts that were not consumer contracts. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (2006) (proposing a theory by which sophisti
cated parties might use boilerplate as an efficient coordinating mechanism by which the
goal of reaching an agreement rather than "winning" might be achieved); Omri Ben
Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Con
tracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 953-54 (2006) (studying the boilerplate provisions in the
contracts by which automobile manufacturers obtain parts from suppliers). Both arti
cles are based upon a presumption that the contracts are constitutive of the business
relationship and are not entirely clear, when talking about the impacts and strategies of
boilerplate, precisely who the sophisticated parties are. Moreover, they presume, be
cause economic theory says the terms ought to have a pricing impact, that the terms do
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have a pricing impact. As Professors Ben-Shahar and White found, there are several
deal points beyond price about which business people in the auto industry care-termi
nation rights, warranty obligations, ownership of intellectual property, for example
but they are correct in observing that "[t]he legal terms in the forms are the tail that is
wagged by the business dog, not vice versa." Ben-Shahar & White, supra, at 964. I
suggest that the contracts qua contracts, as opposed to mere reflections or shadows of
the deal points, are equally as much the tail of the dog, or less.

